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This paper began life as two lectures, given in Saskatchewan in 2012 while I was 
holding the Ariel F. Sallows Chair in Human Rights at the University of 
Saskatchewan.1 I had been struck by parallels between the contemporary advocates 
of giving “Indians” fee simple interests in reserve land,2 and the “enfranchisement” 
schemes which originated before Confederation, in which male Indians who had 
attained a certain level of accomplishment would be given interests in reserve land 
that would eventually ripen into fee simple title and be severed from the reserve; 
these men would become eligible to vote, and shed their Indian status altogether.3 
The similarity between the older enfranchisement plan and the contemporary 
scheme to divide reserves into fee simple parcels, suggested to me that the colonial 
era was not actually over in Canada. I decided to pursue this idea further when it 
met with interest from my two Saskatchewan audiences. 
 
 
 These explorations of past and present colonizing within the context of the 
Indian Act and its predecessors broadened to include far more than just the 
enfranchisement scheme and the modern-day fee simple proposals. It was 
necessary to set the inquiry against the overall historical background.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Professor Eberts holds the Ariel Sallows Chair in Human Rights at the College of Law, University of 
Saskatchewan. 
1 The first was a public lecture given at the University of Regina on February 29, 2012, under the 
auspices of the Department of Political Science. The second was the keynote address at the fall 
continuing legal education seminar of the lawyers of Legal Aid Saskatchewan, September 27, 2012, in 
Saskatoon. 
2  I deliberately use the term “Indian” here because the proposals for fee simple interests in land relate to 
land on reserves under the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5.  For a blueprint of this proposal, see Tom 
Flanagan, Christopher Alcantara and Andre LeDressay, Beyond the Indian Act, McGill-Queens 
University Press, 2010. (“Flanagan et al.”) 
3 First enacted in An Act to encourage the gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes in this Province, and 
to amend the Laws respecting Indians, 20 Vict c 26 (1857). This enfranchisement scheme, in various 
forms, remained in place until 1985.  Enfranchisement was dealt with in sections 109 to 112 of the 
Indian Act, RSC 1970, c I-6. Those sections were all repealed by SC 1985 (1st Supp), c 32, s 20 (“Bill C-
31”). In 1960, registered Indians living on reserve in Canada became eligible to vote in federal elections 
by the Canada Elections Act, SC 1960, c 39, effectively removing the promise of the franchise as an 
inducement to individual assimilation through “enfranchisement” schemes.  A short-lived variation on 
the larger enfranchisement scheme was The Electoral Franchise Act of Canada, SC 1885, c 40, repealed 
by The Franchise Act, 1868, SC 1898, c 14. Under that plan, which applied east of Manitoba, a male 
Indian on reserve could vote if he had possession of a separate and distinct parcel of land on the reserve, 
to which he had made improvements to the value of at least $150.  Again, the link between citizenship 
rights for “Indians” and their assumption of individualized responsibility for plots of reserve land was 
evident.  
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government of Canada pursued a staggeringly ambitious program of separating 
Indigenous peoples from their traditional territories, and acquiring those lands for 
the Crown.  These lands were then either alienated to third parties for settlement, 
resource development, nation-building, or other government purposes, or retained 
as “Crown lands”.   The land acquisitions were accomplished in part through a 
program of Treaty-making with Indigenous peoples, particularly in Ontario and the 
west and north-west, but they also involved de facto acquisition or occupation, 
without going through the formality of making Treaties.  Small tracts of land were 
“reserved” in various ways for Indigenous peoples4; whether these lands were 
reserved under Treaty5 or not, all of the reserves came to be administered under the 
federal Indian Act. The Indian Act, in effect, was the repository for the strategies of 
colonization, and carried them forward to the present day, where their vitality 
remains unabated.  To be clear, I am not contending that we are now living in an 
era of neocolonialism, or some other post-colonial state, with colonizing machinery 
that resembles that of the past.  Rather, I contend that the process of colonization 
which began hundreds of years ago is still going on, using the same strategies and 
many of the same tools developed in past centuries. 
 
 
 I begin this paper with a description of colonization, and in particular, of 
“internal colonization” which is central to the relations between what is now 
Canada and the Indigenous peoples who held this land before the arrival of 
incomers from Europe. I then sketch Canada’s historic and continuing efforts to 
secure possession and control of Indigenous land, whether by way of the historical 
methods or contemporary processes modelled on them.  I link the processes of land 
acquisition to the Indian Act, and apply the understanding of internal colonization 
to that statute. In that context, I look at not only in its provisions about reserve 
lands (affected by both the enfranchisement scheme of yore and modern day 
proposals for fee simple interests in reserve land), but also the definition of who is 
an “Indian” under the Act, which has served the colonizer’s goal of reducing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Looking Forward, Looking Back, Vol 1 (Printed from 
For Seven Generations, published by Libraxus Inc., 1991) (“Commission, Volume 1, part 1”) describes 
some of the ways reserves were created other than by Treaty.  The French Crown would grant land for 
Indian reserves to missionary orders on the theory that the Crown had the right and title to the lands in 
question (at 109); the first reserve in New France was established in 1637 (at 107). Royal Commission 
reported that the creation of reserves in the Atlantic region was “as a result of Indians’ petitions or their 
sorry circumstances, rather than the policy of a central authority” (at 109).  A few reserves were set 
aside in New Brunswick by licences of occupation to individual Indians on behalf of themselves and 
their families or bands, which licences were then confirmed by order-in-council (at 109); In Nova Scotia 
lands were set aside by order-in-council to be held in trust for individuals (at 109); in Prince Edward 
Island one reserve was established by a private benefactor and later private land was purchased with 
government funds in order to create other reserves. (at 109) In pre-Confederation Ontario reserves were 
created by order-in-council or established by trust agreements with missionary societies (at 118-120). 
5 Reserves created by Treaty before Confederation include those established by the Robinson Huron and 
Superior Treaties (1850) and the Manitoulin Island Treaty (1862) in Ontario (Commission, Volume 1, 
part 1, at 118-120) and by 14 land surrender treaties between the governor of the Vancouver Island 
colony, William Douglas, and the Coast Salish and Lekwammen Nations between 1850 and 1854 
(Commission, Volume 1, part 1, at 119 and James (Sa’k’ej) Youngblood Henderson, Treaty Rights in 
the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007) at 255). 
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Indian population.  I argue that Canada is still actively practising internal 
colonization, trying to complete the job which was begun over a century and a half 
ago.   Despite the occasional contemporary public disavowal of its old practices6, 
Canada is still colonizing after all these years.7 
 
 
COLONIZATION 
 
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) comments on the variety of 
methods used by European powers to expand into the rest of the world.8  The 
Commission includes Canada among the four modern-day countries identified by 
“settler colonialism”.9  These four countries, says the RCAP Report, were 
“targeted” for settlement, as “safety valves for the rapidly growing populations of 
European home countries”.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See, for example, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, “Statement of Apology:  
Prime Minister Harper offers full apology on behalf of Canadians for the Indian Residential Schools 
System” (11 June 2008, Ottawa, Ontario) online:   
<http://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100015644/1100100015649>. In its November 12, 2010 
statement of support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Canada 
cited this apology, creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Indian Residential Schools, 
the government’s apology for relocation of Inuit families to the High Arctic, and the honouring of Metis 
War Veterans at Juno Beach as examples of a “shift in Canada’s relationship with First Nations, Inuit, 
and Metis People.”  The statement of endorsement is reproduced in full at “Canada Endorses United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” online: <http://triballink.org/2010/n/canada-
endorses-the-united-nations-declaration-on-the-rights>. 
7 I am not alone in explicitly identifying the Indian Act, as a contemporary instrument of colonialism. 
Cannon and Sunseri, for example, declare “we openly name the Indian Act and all other socio-political 
structures imposed by the Canadian state as imperialist projects” and call its imposition of non-
traditional forms of government “a blatant act of colonialism”; Martin J. Cannon & Lina Sunseri, 
Racism, Colonialism and Indigeneity in Canada: A Reader (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 
2011)  xviii. They associate with settler colonialism the Canadian state’s treatment of all Indigenous 
nations as one ‘Indian race’, and “the imposition of racial hierarchy through Indian status distinctions”: 
xvi and xviii.  
8 Commission, Volume 1 part 1, supra note 4, at 105 
9 These four are Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States (Commission, Volume 1 part 1 
at 105). Interestingly, these four were the only nations to vote against the Declaration at the United 
Nations General Assembly session on September 13, 2007 when it was accepted 114 to 4 with 11 
abstentions.  Of these four nations, “Canada has been the most aggressively opposed to the Declaration, 
rejecting any obligation to implement the Declaration within Canada and campaigning implacably 
against its implementation in international forums.” Alex Neve & Craig Benjamin, “Canada and the 
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:  Opposition Must Give Way to Implementation” 
(Fall 2011) 16 Prairie Forum 1-8, at 2 
10 Commission, Volume 1 part 1, supra note 4 at 105.  Bonita Lawrence identifies a prior, and probably 
overlapping, period of “mercantile colonialism”, characterized by massive invasion and competition for 
markets by Europeans, which destabilized the existing tribal political alliances in eastern America.  
Bonita Lawrence, “Rewriting Histories of the Land:  Colonization and Indigenous Resistance in Eastern 
Canada,” 21-46 in Sherene H. Razack, Race, Space and the Law: Unmapping White Settler Society 
(Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002) at 26-27.  Though she focuses on the eastern seaboard, Lawrence’s 
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 The transplanting of Europeans to what became Canada was, at one level, 
a manifestation of “external colonization”: that “salt-water” expansion by which 
Europeans established themselves in distant places.11 Europeans created the 
governmental framework of Canada as an “external” colony, first of France and 
then of Great Britain, a colony forming part of the extended empire of an imperial 
European state.12  Paul Kael emphasizes that the relations between imperial state 
and colony were Inherently unequal, with the imperial state controlling the 
sovereignty of the colony.13 One celebrated narrative of the Canadian state features 
its evolution from colony to nation, to use Arthur R.M. Lower’s evocative phrase14.  
In that story, patriation of the Canadian constitution from the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom at Westminster in 198215 marks Canada’s final achievement of 
full sovereignty as a nation. 
 
 
 Lower’s colony to nation narrative of Canada illustrates one of James 
Tully’s crucial points about external colonies. Where the colony and the imperial 
power are located on different territories, “the colonies can free themselves and 
form geographically independent societies with exclusive jurisdiction over their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
observation is equally true of the impact of the fur trade and other mercantile activities that penetrated 
from the east into central and ultimately western Canada, or from the Pacific coast inland. 
11 Paul Kael uses Catherine Irons’s terms:  external colonization, external colonization by neighbouring 
states, and internal colonization, stating that “by external colonization is meant so-called ‘salt-water’ 
colonization in which aliens colonized distant places.”  Paul Kael, European Conquest and the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness of International Society (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) at 43 
12 The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples pointed out that there were basic differences between 
the constitutions of the settler colonies created by European powers, which stemmed largely, if not 
entirely, from explicit grants of power, in the form of royal charters, proclamations, commissions, 
instructions or Acts of Parliament, supplemented by basic unwritten principles, and the constitutions of 
Aboriginal nations which “sprang from their own internal arrangements and philosophies and were 
nourished by their inherent powers as self-governing nations….”  Commission, Volume 1, at 91, and see 
the discussion below about the governments established in new British colonies in the Americas, by 
means of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 
13 Kael, op. cit. supra note 11, at 37-38 and 41, relying on the definition of imperialism fashioned by 
Benjamin Cohen and of empire created by Michael Doyle.  
14 Arthur R.M. Lower, Colony to Nation: A History of Canada, 1st ed (Toronto, Longmans, Greene & 
Company, 1946); 5th ed (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977).  Francis writes that “Lower’s desire 
was to free Canada from its restricting position in the Empire-Commonwealth and thus allow it to reach 
full maturity as a nation-state – to evolve from colony to nation”:  R. Douglas Francis, “The Golden Age 
of Canadian National Historiography” (1977) 6:2 Acadiensis 106 at 106-107 and places him in a group 
of Canadian historians including Frank Underhill and Harold Innis which wanted to “carve out a 
Canadian ‘civilization’ in the wilderness”, Ibid at 116. The “civilization” of Canada through 
historiography presents a striking parallel to the “civilization” that was sought for Indigenous peoples 
through the instrumentality if the Indian Act and related government policy.  The model of civilization 
in both cases was that of white, colonizing Europe. 
15 Canada Act, 1982 (UK) (1982, c 11) to which was appended, as Schedule B, the Constitution Act, 
1982. 
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own territories….”16 This is not possible with internal colonization.  Tully observes 
that the “ground of the relationship” between the colonizer and the colonized in an 
internal colony is “the appropriation of the land, resources and jurisdiction of the 
indigenous peoples, not only for the sake of resettlement and exploitation (which is 
also true in external colonization) but for the territorial foundation of the dominant 
society itself.”17  There is, in this model, no geographical separation between 
dominant and subordinated, imperial and colonized, to provide a land-based 
platform from which the colonized can assert or reassert sovereignty. 
 
 
 Interwoven with the narrative of Canada as an evolving, and ultimately 
fully sovereign, external colony of Europe, then, is the story of internal 
colonization of the Indigenous peoples on the land mass of what is now Canada. 
This internal colonization was effected at first by European powers; at 
Confederation, the Canadian state assumed the dominant role of internal 
colonizer18. So-called “settler colonies”, like Canada, are an instance of internal 
colonialism; such colonies were not primarily established to “extract surplus value 
from Indigenous labour”, but were premised on displacing Indigenous peoples from 
the land (or replacing them on it).19 
 
 
 The RCAP Report describes the complex displacement of Indigenous 
peoples integral to the process of internal colonization. Indigenous peoples were 
physically displaced from their traditional territories; they were socially and 
culturally displaced, as missionary activities and European schools undermined the 
ability to transmit traditional knowledge and values from one generation to the next 
and substituted the values of Victorian Europe; and they were politically displaced 
as colonial laws forced them to abandon or at least disguise traditional governing 
structures and processes in favour of colonial municipal institutions.20  RCAP notes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 James Tully, “The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom,” in Duncan Ivison, Paul 
Patton & Will Saunders, eds, Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) 36-59 at 39. 
17 Tully, supra note 16, at 39 
18 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, 91(24).  See Olive Patricia Dickason & David T. McNab, 
Canada’s First Nations:  A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times, 4th ed, (Don Mills, Ont: 
Oxford University Press, 2009) at 216, at which the authors refer in footnote 9 to John E. Hodgetts, 
Pioneer Public Service:  An Administrative History of the United Canadas, 1842-1867 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1955) at 223 for his description of the transfer of Indian administration 
from London to Canada. 
19 Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology:  the Politics and Poetics 
of an Ethnographic Event (London: Cassell, 1999) at 1.  Wolfe illustrates his point with reference to the 
clearing of Native North Americans from their land, and the importation of African slaves to provide 
labour on that expropriated land: see 1-2.  See also Tully, op. cit. supra note 16, at 39 
20 Commission, Volume 1, part 1 at 105 
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that the negotiation of Treaties continued side by side with “the legislated 
dispossession through the Indian Act”21. It states, “From the Crown perspective it 
seemed clear that these treaties were little more than real estate transactions 
designed to free Aboriginal lands for settlement and resource development.”22 
 
 
 Tully describes one of the fundamental contradictions of internal 
colonization as “the dominant society coexists on and exercises exclusive 
jurisdiction over the territories and jurisdictions that indigenous peoples refuse to 
surrender.”23  He asserts that since the beginning, “the long-term aim of the 
administrators of the system has been to resolve the contradictions by the complete 
disappearance of the indigenous problem: that is, the disappearance of the 
indigenous peoples as free peoples with the rights to their territories and 
governments.”24  Tully identifies two strategies for bringing that about.  One is that 
the Indigenous peoples could become extinct in fact (by dying out, intermarriage, 
urbanization) or by extinguishing their will to resist assimilation.  The second “and 
more common” strategy, in Tully’s view, is to attempt to extinguish the rights of 
Indigenous peoples to their territories and self-government.” 25Both of these 
strategies have been used historically and are used today. 
 
 
LANDS SURRENDERED AND LAND RESERVED: THE FOUNDATION OF INTERNAL 
COLONIZATION 
 
The Treaty of Paris, 1763, marked the ascendancy of Great Britain over France in 
the Americas.  Following the signing of the Treaty, King George III issued in 1763 
a Royal Proclamation establishing a framework for the governance of Britain’s new 
possessions. The Royal Proclamation created four “distinct and separate 
Governments”, including that of Quebec, the former French colony.  The 
Governors of these new colonies were directed to summon General Assemblies, 
which, along with the Governors and their Executive Councils, would make “Laws, 
Statutes, and Ordinances” for their “Public Peace, Welfare, and good Government” 
“as near as may be agreeable to the Laws of England.” The Governors were also 
given the power to make grants of land to persons in those colonies or coming from 
other British colonies “upon such Terms…as have been appointed and settled in 
our other Colonies, and under such other Conditions, as shall appear to us to be 
necessary and expedient for the Advantage of the Grantees, and the Improvement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Commission, Volume 1, part 1 at 105-106 
22 Commission, Volume 1, part 1, at 106. And see also 117, 120.  These comments are directed at both 
the Ontario Treaties and the numbered Treaties signed in the former Northwest Territory, west and north 
of the Manitoba/Ontario border. 
23 Tully, op. cit. supra note 16, at 39 
24 Tully, op. cit. supra note 16, at 40 (emphasis in original) 
25 Tully, op. cit. supra note 16, at 40 
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and settlement of our said Colonies.”26  This creation of public governments for the 
colonies, reflecting the Westminster model and exercising limited powers conferred 
by the Monarch, was not the approach which the Royal Proclamation took to the 
Crown’s Indigenous allies. 
 
 
 The Royal Proclamation of 1763 expressed the Monarch’s view that: 
 
…it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the security of 
our Colonies, that the several nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We 
are connected, and who live under our Protection, should not be molested 
or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and 
Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are reserved 
to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds…27 
 
 
 The Proclamation also declared the King’s “Royal Will and Pleasure”: 
 
 
To reserve under our Sovereignty, Protection, and Dominion, for the use 
of the said Indians, all the Lands and Territories not included within the 
Limits of Our said Three new Governments, or within the Limits of the 
Territory granted to the Hudson’s Bay Company, as also all the Lands and 
Territories lying to the Westward of the Sources Of the Rivers which fall 
into the Sea from the West and North West as aforesaid…28 
 
 
 The Proclamation forbade “all our loving Subjects from making any 
Purchases or Settlements whatever, or taking Possession of any of the Lands above 
reserved, without our especial leave and Licence for that Purpose first obtained.”29  
Moreover, the Proclamation also provided that even in the parts of the colonies 
where the King had thought it appropriate to allow settlement, no private person 
should purchase land directly from the Indians in any Lands reserved to the 
Indians.  Rather, declared the Proclamation: 
 
 
…if at any Time any of the Said Indians should be inclined to dispose of 
the said Lands, the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our Name, at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The Royal Proclamation, October 7, 1763, as reproduced in Brian A. Crane et al., First Nations 
Governance Law, 2d ed, (LexisNexis, 2008) at Appendix 1, page 327.  The quoted passages are found at 
327-330. 
27 Royal Proclamation, op. cit. supra note 26, at 330 
28 Ibid. 
29 Royal Proclamation, op. cit. supra note 26, at 331 
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some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for that 
Purpose by the Governor or Commander in Chief of our Colony…30 
 
 
 The huge land mass affected by the Proclamation was occupied by a 
diverse population of Indigenous nations, with their own languages, cultures, 
beliefs, and practices. In the Proclamation, the single term “Indian” is employed to 
encompass all of them.  The uses to which the various parts of these traditional 
lands were put varied with the seasons, and the economic, social, and spiritual 
practices of the peoples inhabiting them.  Yet, the Proclamation refers solely to 
“Hunting Grounds”.  The reduction of a complex web of peoples and societies to a 
unidimensional “Indian” population, that was to characterize the Indian Act, had 
already begun with the Proclamation. 
 
 
 The Proclamation contemplates only two kinds of transactions in land 
between the Crown and Indigenous peoples.  On the one hand is the Indigenous act 
of selling or ceding land to the Crown.  On the other is the Crown’s “reservation” 
of lands to the Indigenous peoples. The Proclamation leaves it open for Indigenous 
peoples to remain in possession of their lands, presumably to govern those lands as 
they had always done, at least as a matter of constitutional theory.  It is that 
constitutional space which is one of the primary assets of the Proclamation as a 
rights-conferring or protecting instrument. However, the realpolitik of the situation 
was that pressure from settlers and developers to acquire those vast lands was 
intense, and the Indigenous peoples were comparatively powerless to resist it.  It 
was, in these circumstances, not unwise to cast the Crown into the role of protector 
of Indigenous interests. 
 
 
 Yet nothing in the Proclamation laid out standards of ethical behaviour for 
the Crown to follow in its role of protector.  Such standards were clearly necessary, 
because the Crown itself (later the government of Canada) was one of the primary 
driving forces behind the opening of Canada for settlement and resource 
development, a role which could, and did, conflict with its role as protector of 
Indigenous interests.  By way of the Proclamation the Crown gave itself a 
monopoly on acquisition of lands from Indigenous peoples, but the Proclamation 
did not enforce, or even recommend, Crown moderation in taking over Indigenous 
lands, or require that fair market value be paid for these lands. These shortcomings 
in the Proclamation, and the absence of other standards of behaviour for Crown 
exercise of the monopoly it enjoyed, opened the way for predatory behaviour by 
the Crown that would be cemented into the administrative and legislative 
arrangements of the Canadian state by way of the Indian Act. 31 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid. 
31 In Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, [2002] 4 SCR 245, Binnie J. for the Court observes at para 80 
that “the degree of economic, social and proprietary control and discretion asserted by the Crown also 
left aboriginal populations vulnerable to the risk of government misconduct or ineptitude.”  I mention 
the absence of standards to govern Crown behaviour quite deliberately here, fully aware of the later 
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 Following the issuance of the Royal Proclamation, the use of Treaty as a 
mechanism of land cession by First Nations was first practised extensively in what 
is now Ontario.  In what J.R. Miller calls the “first stage of Upper Canadian Treaty-
making”32 between the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the beginning of the War 
of 1812, Great Britain acquired all the land along the Great Lakes and other 
boundary waters in southern Ontario.33   In the second stage of treaty-making, 
between 1815 and 1827, seven treaties with the Crown opened up for settlement 
and other purposes almost all of the remaining arable land in southern Ontario34 By 
1836, the Crown had acquired access to all of the arable land in Upper Canada 
south of the Canadian Shield.35  Treaty-making resumed in 1850, because of the 
desire to open up the Shield to mining.36 Under the direction of Treaty 
Commissioner William B. Robinson, the Robinson Huron and Superior Treaties 
were concluded in 1850, acquiring very large tracts of territory in west and 
northern parts of what is now Ontario.37  The Manitoulin Island Treaty of 1862, 
granting the western part of that Island to the Crown, was the last pre-
Confederation Treaty in Upper Canada.38 As the sale of their lands progressed, 
“First Nations were confined to smaller and smaller tracts, typically in areas that 
were least suited to European settlement, agriculture or resource extraction.”39 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
development in Canadian law of finding such standards in “the honour of the Crown.”  Historically, and 
in contemporary Canada, the honour of the Crown has not actually been a reliable inspiration of moral 
behaviour from the Crown or the Canadian government, although it has been used to support a 
theoretical obligation for such behaviour. 
32 JR Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant:  Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2009), at 91. 
33 Op cit supra, note 32, at 90.  There were thirteen treaties in this period, the making of which is 
described in Miller, op cit supra, note 32 at 79-90 
34 JR Miller, op cit supra note 32, at 93-95 
35 JR Miller, op cit supra  note 32, at 109.  The largest acquisition was from the Saugeen, who lost much 
of their 1.5 million acres on first, the southern part, and then the northern part, of the Bruce Peninsula in 
Ontario, in a treaty of 1836, and later dispossession in 1854.  Miller, at 107; Commission, Volume 1, at 
118-120, 196-197 
36 JR Miller, op cit supra note 32, at 110 
37 JR Miller, op cit supra note 32, at 114, 117 
38 JR Miller, op cit supra, note 32, at 118, 121.  Another “round” of Treaty-making in Ontario occurred 
in 1923, after it was realized that title to lands around Georgina Island, Rama, Scugog, Curve Lake and 
Alderville had never been extinguished, and the government obtained land surrenders through the two 
Williams Treaties. JR Miller, op. cit. supra, note 41, at 223-225 
39 Commission, Volume 1, part 1, at 118 
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 At Confederation, legislative authority over “Indians and Lands reserved 
for Indians” was assigned to the government of Canada by section 91 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867.40  The first post-Confederation statute of the government of 
Canada to deal with Indian lands, passed in 1868, provided that “All lands reserved 
for Indians or for any tribe, band or body of Indians, or held in trust for their 
benefit, shall be deemed to be reserved and held for the same purposes as before 
the passage of this Act, but subject to its provisions.”41  The Act also provided that 
“no such lands shall be sold, alienated or leased until they have been released or 
surrendered to the Crown for the purposes of this Act.”42  Just as the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 had set out the conditions for a valid surrender or cession of 
Indian lands to the Crown43, the 1868 Act also established conditions for a valid 
surrender, and stipulated that a surrender could only be made to the Crown.44  The 
stage was already being set, in the young nation, for the state’s acquisition of what 
small pieces of land remained to Indigenous peoples (in the form of reserves) after 
the pre-Confederation round of settlement, land appropriation, and cession by 
Treaty.  Land surrender remains a feature of the Indian Act down to the present 
day.45 
 
 
 The first comprehensive statute dealing with Indian matters was passed by 
Canada in 1876.46 The Indian Act, 1876 defined “reserve” as any tract or tracts of 
land set apart by treaty or otherwise for the use or benefit of, or granted to, a 
particular band of Indians, of which the legal title is in the Crown, but which is 
unsurrendered.47 RCAP points out that this legislation was passed in “the midst of 
the treaty-making process going on in western Canada”48. Indeed, Treaties 1 
through 7 were concluded between 1871 and 187749; these western numbered 
Treaties followed closely upon the acquisition of the Hudson’s Bay Company 
territory in Rupert’s Land and the North-Western Territory by Great Britain and its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c.3 (UK), s 91 (24). 
41 An Act providing for the organization of the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada, and for 
the management of Indian and Ordnance Lands, SC 1868, c 42, s 6. 
42 Ibid. 
43 The Proclamation provided that the lands were to be purchased “only for Us, in our Name, at some 
public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for that Purpose by the Governor or 
Commander in Chief of our Colony….”.  Crane et al. op cit supra note 26 at 331. 
44 SC 1868, c 42, ss 8-10. 
45 See “Surrenders and Designations”¸ ss 37-4, ss 37-41, and “Management of Reserves and Surrendered 
and Designated Lands,” ss 53-60 in Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5. 
46 An Act to amend and consolidate the laws respecting Indians, 39 Vict. 1876, c 18 (“ Indian Act, 
1876”). 
47 Indian Act, 1876, s 6. 
48 Commission, Volume 1, part 2, unit 8, at 66. 
49 JR Miller, op cit supra note 32, at 166. 
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transfer to Canada.50  Four more numbered Treaties, covering more northerly lands, 
were made between 1899 and 192151. The numbered Treaties contained formulae 
for determining how much land would be allocated to the peoples signing or 
adhering to the Treaty, and thus the size of the “reserves” they would inhabit. 
Although the definition of “reserve” in the Indian Act, 1876  includes tracts of land 
set apart by Treaty, RCAP points out that the Act is otherwise silent on the question 
of the Treaties already made, and those in process when the Act was passed. RCAP 
comments, “It is almost as if Canada deliberately allowed itself to forget the 
principal constitutional mechanism by which the nation status of Indian 
communities is recognized in domestic law.”52  The Manitoba Justice 
Implementation Commission argues that while Indigenous peoples were 
negotiating the numbered Treaties under the expectation that they would continue 
as before to govern their own affairs, the Crown knew that it would be imposing a 
legislative regime to suppress traditional authority, and did not communicate that 
knowledge across the table. 53 
 
 
 There is no specific suite of provisions in the Indian Act dealing with land 
affected by treaties. There was no administrative structure created in government to 
ensure that the Treaties were implemented54 and Treaties were not put into their 
own specific implementing legislation55.   Absent any specific provisions to 
implement the Treaties or administer lands affected by Treaty, the Indian Act 
became the governing statute, applying in the same fashion to land acquired with or 
without Treaty. Under the Indian Act regime, the government of Canada exercised 
virtually total control over Indian lands, including power to lease or sell them56. In 
fact, while the Treaty-making process was still going on, between 1896 and 1911, 
there were over 100 surrenders of Treaty reserve land under the Indian Act, with 
21% of the land which had been so recently reserved by Treaty to the Prairie First 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The acquisition by Britain was by means of the Rupert’s Land Act, 1868 (UK), 31-32 Vict,      c 105, 
and these lands were admitted to Canada by The Order of Her Majesty in Council Admitting Rupert’s 
Land and North-Western Territory into the Union, 1870 (UK), RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 9, in 
accordance with s 146 of the Constitution Act, 1867. See JR Miller, op cit supra, note 32, at 430 and fn 
11. 
51 Treaty 8 (1899), Treaty 9 (1905), Treaty 10 (1906) and Treaty 11 (1921), JR Miller, op cit supra note 
32, at 187 
52 Commission, Volume 1, part 2, unit 8, at 67 
53 Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Implementation Commission, The Justice System and Aboriginal People, 
chapter 5, Aboriginal & Treaty Rights, at page 30, online: 
<http://www.ajic.mb.ca/volume1/chapter5/html>.  
54 Commission, Volume 1, part 1, at 134.  
55Commission, Volume 1, part 1, at 134-135 
56 Before land could be leased or sold, it had to be surrendered to the Crown, in accordance with the 
procedure for surrender set out in the Indian Act, a procedure which reflected that set out in the Royal 
Proclamation.  See sections 25 to 28 of Indian Act, 1876. 
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Nations being surrendered to the Crown.57 Some of these surrenders were of 
dubious morality, not just because the stewardship duties of the Department of 
Indian Affairs conflicted with the mandate of its alter ego, the Department of the 
Interior, to open up the west; three Superintendents General or Deputies used their 
positions for personal gain in the transactions. 58 The sheer number and size of the 
surrenders have led one commentator to describe this era as “a brief and shameful 
period in Canadian history.”59 
 
 
 The Indian Act, 1876 made clear that reserve lands were held in common.  
It defined a “band” as any tribe, band or body of Indians who own or are interested 
in a reserve, or in Indian lands in common, of which the legal title is vested in the 
Crown.60  The recognition that reserve lands are held in common continues to the 
present day61, and is one of the protections established in the Royal Proclamation of 
1763 which endures.  However, in the 1876 Act, the Superintendent General of 
Indian Affairs was given power to order that a reserve be surveyed and divided into 
lots, and to require that band members obtain “location tickets” for individual plots 
of land.62  This creation of individual possessory interests in reserve land was 
carried over into successive versions of the Indian Act, with the evidence of such 
interests now being termed certificates of possession.63 
 
 
 By conflating Treaty and non-Treaty situations, and administering all 
“Indian” matters through the Indian Act, Canada subjected to the assimilative 
forces of the Indian Act all of those Nations who had signed or adhered to Treaty 
expecting a relationship of more equality or mutuality with the Crown.  
Government hegemony over Indigenous peoples by way of the Indian Act was very 
different from the purportedly benevolent and protective, but respectful, stance of 
the Monarch in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.  The Indian Act reduced all of the 
Indigenous nations who had once arguably been the Treaty partners of the Crown 
(and even before that, its military allies), into small polities structured and managed 
according to a single legislative template that left them with almost no power. 
Moreover, Nations who had never ceded land in the manner required by the Royal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Peggy Martin-McGuire, First Nation Land Surrenders in the Prairies, 1896-1911 (Prepared for the 
Indian Claims Commission, Ottawa, September 1998) xiii-xvi. 
58 Martin-McGuire, op cit supra note 57, at xviii. 
59 Martin-McGuire, op cit supra note 57, at xiii. 
60 Indian Act, 1876, s 3.1.  Emphasis supplied. 
61 The definition of Band in section 2(1)(a) of the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5, is that it is a body of 
Indians for whose use and benefit in common lands, the legal title to which is vested in Her Majesty, 
have been set apart. 
62 Commission, Volume 1, part 1 at 68. 
63 Indian Act  RSC 1985, c I-5, ss 20-27. The recording of individual possessory interests in reserve land 
is done in a central registry in Ottawa, but this registry does not establish priorities or other protections 
like those found in a modern Torrens land title system, or even a land registry system.   
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Proclamation of 1763 were similarly swept into the constraining structure of the 
Indian Act, in spite of claims to continuing sovereignty over their lands.  64 
 
 
“OLD FAMILIAR WAYS”65 STILL A SUPPORT AND COMFORT 
 
Published just after the centennial of Confederation, in 1969, Canada’s White Paper 
on Indian policy66provides a snapshot of government thinking not only at that time, 
but also for the preceding century.  The White Paper embraced the goal of 
promoting “true equality”67 for Indian people, proposing that the Indian Act should 
be repealed and legislation passed to permit Indians to control Indian lands (ie 
reserves) and acquire title to them.68  Responsibility for Indians would devolve 
upon the provinces and the federal Department of Indian Affairs would be wound 
up.69 The White Paper spoke of Canada’s “ultimate aim of removing the specific 
references to Indians from the constitution” so as to end the legal distinctions 
between Indians and other Canadians.70  This is the “civilization” and assimilation 
of the 1857 Act by another name. 
 
 
 The White Paper acknowledged that “Many of the Indian people…believe 
that lands have been taken from them in an improper manner, or without adequate 
compensation, that their funds have been improperly administered, that their treaty 
rights have been breached.”71  However, Canada asserted that “the terms and 
effects of the treaties between the Indian people and the Government are widely 
misunderstood.”72 It continued, “A plain reading of the words used in the treaties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The Nisga’a never ceased to assert their claim to their traditional lands in northwestern British 
Columbia.  In a Petition to the King in 1913, the Nisga’a Nation asserted that “No part of the said 
territory has been ceded to or purchased by the Crown.”  Hamar Foster, Heather Raven & Jeremy 
Webber, Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Peoples 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), at 243: Appendix B (The Nisga’a Petition of 1913), Article 5.  Yet it 
was necessary to stipulate in the Nisga’a Final Agreement that lands owned by the Nisga’a will no 
longer be reserve lands under the Indian Act:  Nisga’a Final Agreement in Brief, Appendix II to Tom 
Molloy, The World is Our Witness:  The Historic Journey of the Nisga’a into Canada (Calgary: Fifth 
House Ltd, 2000) at 220. 
65 In Paul Simon’s song, “Still crazy after all these years”, from which the title to this paper has been 
adapted, he says “I seem to lean on old familiar ways”. © 1975 words and music by Paul Simon. 
66 Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Statement of the Government of 
Canada on Indian Policy (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969). (“White Paper”) 
67 White Paper, at 6. 
68 White Paper, at 6, 11-12. 
69 White Paper, at 6. 
70 White Paper, at 8. 
71 White Paper, at 11. 
72 White Paper, at 11. 
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reveals the limited and minimal promises that were included in them.”73  The 
government argued that the significance of the treaties “has always been limited 
and will continue to decline” and predicted that “Once Indian lands are securely 
within Indian control, the anomaly of treaties between groups within society and 
the government of that society will require that these treaties be reviewed to see 
how they can be equitably ended.”74 
 
 
 The White Paper did acknowledge the need to explore ways of dealing 
with claims arising from the performance of the terms of treaties and other 
agreements, and the administration of monies and lands under legislation relating to 
Indians.  In addition to these “specific claims”, Canada also recognized that some 
of the land which had been promised under certain of the numbered Treaties had 
still not been allocated.75  With respect to “aboriginal claims to land”, however, the 
White Paper states that “these are so general and undefined that it is not realistic to 
think of them as specific claims capable of remedy except through a policy and 
program that will end injustice to Indians as members of the Canadian 
community.”76 
 
 
 The White Paper was widely criticized77 and withdrawn in 1970.  Shortly 
after that, in 1973, the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Calder78made the 
government reassess its rejection of Indian rights to land.79  In Calder, the Court 
recognized that the Indigenous interest in their ancestral lands constituted a legal 
interest that predated European settlement.80  After Calder, the government of 
Canada acknowledged not just the specific claims arising from previous 
administration of treaty or statute, and treaty land entitlement claims under the 
numbered treaties 81 but also what came to be known as comprehensive claims,82 
involving claims to land and, often, governance rights. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 White Paper, at 11. 
74 Both quoted passages are from White Paper, at 11. 
75 White Paper at 11. 
76 White Paper at 11. 
77 Two of the strongest critiques of the White Paper were “A Presentation by the Indian Chiefs of 
Alberta to the Right Honourable P.E. Trudeau, Prime Minister and the Government of Canada”, Citizens 
Plus, June 1970, (“the Red Paper”), and Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs, A Declaration of Indian Rights: 
The B.C. Indian Position Paper, Vancouver, BC, November 17, 1970, (“the Brown Paper”). 
78 Calder v Attorney General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 113. 
79 This view is taken from R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at para 50. 
80 Binnie J. in Mitchell v Canada (MNR), [2001] 1 SCR 911 at para 67 and Wewaykum Indian Band v 
Canada, [2002] 4 SCR 245 at para 75. 
81 A treaty land entitlement claim arises when a First Nation asserts that the government did not provide 
all of the reserve land promised in a Treaty.  Once the government is satisfied that the First Nation has a 
valid claim, a settlement is negotiated and set out in a treaty land entitlement agreement.  Most of the 
TLE claims relate to land in Manitoba and Saskatchewan.  Auditor-General of Canada, 2009 March 
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 The publication of the White Paper in 1969 effectively derailed the work 
then underway to establish a body to deal in a systematic way with specific claims 
arising from government administration under Treaty or statute83, which had been 
recommended in July 1947 by the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and 
House of Commons. 84 It was not until 2008 that Canada put in place an 
independent claims tribunal that could make binding adjudications on specific 
claims.85 Until the 1960s, these claims were handled through the regular 
administrative processes of the government, and occasionally by reference to an 
outside third party.86 Daniel concludes that “while it was sometimes recognized by 
government that administrative decisions on claims were not always adequate 
politically, there was not, apparently, any recognition that such decisions were 
frequently neither just nor efficient….”.87 He comments that administrative 
solutions “assume that the Crown is capable of determining where its 
responsibilities lie…”88  From 1969 to 2008, the government appointed Claims 
Commissioners under the Public Inquiries Act, who could investigate and make 
recommendations but not make any binding determination.89 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Status Report, ch 4, Treaty Land Obligations online: <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca-
internet/English/parl_oag_200903_04_3_32291.html> (“Auditor-General Report”). Although the White 
Paper recognized 1n 1969 that Canada had outstanding obligations, implementing a solution would take 
almost fifty years.  The volume of land at issue was large.  In the 1992 Saskatchewan Treaty Land 
Entitlement Framework Agreement, and 8 other individual agreements, $415 million was provided to 33 
First Nations to allow them to acquire up to 2.7 million acres of land.  The 1997 Manitoba Treaty Land 
Entitlement Agreement and 8 other individual agreements made available up to 1.4 million additional 
acres of reserve lands.  Additional agreements were later signed. In addition to the delay between the 
White Paper date of 1969 and the signing of the framework agreements in the 1990s, there has also been 
delay in implementing the agreements, including a processing time of from 5 to 7 years to convert to 
reserve status the land that is chosen by the First Nations. Auditor-General Report, at 4-8 
82 Comprehensive land claims are those based on the assertion of continuing Aboriginal rights and 
claims to land that have not been dealt with by treaty or other means; they are based on claims of 
unextinguished Aboriginal title. 
83 Richard C Daniel, A History of Native Claims Processes in Canada, 1867-1979 (Prepared for 
Research Branch, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, February 1980) at 217 (“Daniel”). 
84 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Specific Claims: Justice at Last; History of Calls for and Efforts 
to Create an Independent Tribunal on Specific Claims, nd (one leaf flyer forming part of the 
government’s package distributed with the new legislation in 2007). 
85 The Specific Claims Tribunal Act, SC 2008, c 22.  
86 Daniel, at 208. 
87 Daniel at 208. 
88 Daniel at 210. 
89 The first such Commissioner was Lloyd Barber appointed in December 1969.  James Morrison, 
“Archives and Native Claims,” (1979-1980) 9 Archivaria 15. The Indian Specific Claims Commission 
began in 1991, conducting investigations and providing mediation services.  Like Professor Barber, the 
Commission operated under the federal Inquiries Act.  From 1994, it called upon the government to 
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 The ad hoc approach to dealing with specific claims resulted in “both 
chronic inefficiency and instances of continuing glaring injustice.90 Government 
had been aware since the end of World War II that there was a backlog of claims91.  
In 2007, it was reported that there were more than 1,300 claims filed against 
Canada, and Professor Michael Coyle of the University of Western Ontario made a 
somewhat conservative estimate that at the current rate, it would take 50 years for 
the federal government to resolve the claims already filed.92 The desperately slow 
pace of addressing some of these claims is evident.  The Caldwell First Nation, 
whose traditional lands included Point Pelee on the Lake Erie shore in Ontario, 
pressed claims from the 1830s, seeking benefits provided for under a 1790 Treaty, 
and land at Point Pelee promised to them for their military assistance to the British 
in the War of 1812.  It was not until 2010 that they received a settlement.93 Claims 
were submitted in 1986, and settled in 2010, by the Fort William First Nation and 
the Mississaugas of the New Credit.94 The process for each claim took 24 years.  
More striking is the fact that the Fort William claim arose from faulty land surveys 
conducted in 1853 to implement the 1850 Robinson Superior Treaty, and the 
Mississauga Claim arose from the exploitative terms of an 1805 surrender to the 
British of 251,000 acres of land in what is now Toronto.95 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
create an independent permanent body to expedite the resolution of specific claims.  Chief 
Commissioner’s Message, Indian Claims Commission, Treasury Board Secretariat, 2008 online: 
<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2008-2009/(inst/icc/icc01-eng.asp>. 
90 Olive Patricia Dickason & David T McNab, Canada’s First Nations:  A History of Founding Peoples 
from Earliest Times, 4th ed (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 446. 
91 Daniel at 216.  
92 John Miner, “Powder Keg”, London Free Press, February 19, 2007, University of Western Ontario 
permalink, online: <http://www.law.uwo.ca/News/February_07/19.02.07_Coyle.html>. Dickason’s 
figures are even more discouraging.  Although she cites (op. cit. supra note 90 at 443) estimates that 
there are more than 1,000 unresolved specific claims on the books at the time her book was prepared (a 
smaller number than Coyle), she refers at 446 to estimates by the Assembly of First Nations that at the 
current pace of settling claims (an average of about 13 years) it would take about 130 years to resolve all 
claims. 
93 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Fact Sheet:  Caldwell First Nation Specific Claim, October 2006 
(modified 2008-10-30), online: <http://www.ainc.inac.gc.ca/ai/mr/nr/s-d2006/02788bk-eng.asp> and 
Carys Mills, “First Nation accepts $105M land-claim settlement,” Postmedia News, August 22, 2010, 
online: <http://www.montrealgazette.com/First+Nation+band +accepts=105M+land+claim+settlem >. 
94 “Fort William settles claim after 160 years,” Anishnabek News, Vol 22, Issue 10 (Reprinted with 
permission from the Thunder Bay Chronical-Journal newspaper) at 1; Mississaugas of the New Credit 
First Nation, Toronto Purchase Specific Claim: Arriving at an Agreement (nd); Mike Adler, “Toronto 
Council, Mississaugas of the New Credit Celebrate land claim settlement,” Inside Toronto, June 10, 
2010, online: <http://www.insidetoronto.com/news-story/52346-toronto-council-mississaugas-of-the-
new-credit-celebrate-land-claim-settlement>. 
95 Loc cit supra note 94. 
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 Specific claims reflect Indigenous peoples’ attempts to get redress for the 
continuing injustices of historical acts of colonization.  They involve instances 
where First Nations were shortchanged on the implementation of Treaty promises, 
where their entitlements were taken from them through sharp dealing, or where 
decades of government resistance and foot-dragging prevented resolution of 
Indigenous peoples’ legitimate expectations. Through the Specific Claims process, 
and its specialized counterpart, the Treaty Land Entitlement process, First Nations 
try to secure the performance of Treaties they entered into many decades, or even 
centuries, before, or promises given long ago, or try to reverse the effect of 
maladministration or corruption. There is a sad track record of such abuses.  The 
Co-Chair of RCAP, Rene Dussault, has pointed out that Indigenous communities 
today have less than one-third the land base accorded to them by the written terms 
of their historic Treaties,  because Treaty allocations were not made, or allocated 
land was later expropriated or sold for highways, railways, hydro lines, the St. 
Lawrence Seaway, and cities.96  Canada’s refusal to deal, honourably --- or, indeed, 
at all --- with these important claims, has brought its relations with Indigenous 
peoples into profound crisis on more than one occasion. 
 
 
 For over two centuries, the Mohawks of Kanesetake repeatedly laid claim 
to lands holding deep historical and sacred significance to them, which had been 
granted by King Louis XV of France to the seminary of St. Sulpice. Their claims 
were rebuffed in numerous forums from 1781 onwards. In contemporary times, 
Canada failed to respond to their request in 1961 to make the land a reserve, 
rejected a comprehensive claim to the land filed in 1975, and in 1986 rejected a 
specific claim which had been filed in 1977.  In 1990, the town of Oka Quebec 
proposed to expand its golf course into sites sacred to the Mohawks, and a standoff 
of several months ensued.  One Quebec Provincial Police Officer was killed, and 
the Canadian Army was mobilized to break up the blockade. In the aftermath of 
this crisis, in 1991, Canada established the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, which rendered its report in 1996. To date, more than twenty years after its 
establishment, the recommendations of the Royal Commission remain in limbo. 97 
 
 
 In September 1995, unarmed peaceful protesters from Stoney Point First 
Nation occupied Ipperwash Provincial Park in Ontario; protester Dudley George, 
shot by the Ontario Provincial Police during that occupation, was the first 
Indigenous person to be killed in a land rights dispute since the nineteenth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Rene Dussault and George Erasmus, Address for the launch of the report of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples,” Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (last modified 2010-09-15) 
at 5, online: <http://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014639/ 1100100014640>. 
97 This abbreviated account is drawn from Dickason, op cit supra note 90, at 319-324. 
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century.98 A Commission of Inquiry finally called 8 years later to investigate the 
shooting and its background reported on a long and sorry record of government 
abuse of the land rights of the Kettle Point and Stoney Point peoples.  By the Huron 
Tract Treaty of 1827, the Kettle Point and Stoney Point peoples ceded over two 
million acres of land, keeping less than 1% of that area as reserves, but pressure for 
additional surrenders continued.  In 1927 part of the Kettle Point beach-front on 
Lake Huron was surrendered, followed in 1928 by the surrender of all of the Stoney 
Point beachfront. Canada sold this land, at three times its purchase price, to 
Ontario, which established a provincial park in 1936, leaving a sacred burial site on 
the land unprotected.99 Both the Ontario Court of Appeal, and the Ipperwash 
Inquiry found “an odour of moral failure” in the Crown’s dealings with the First 
Nations over these surrenders.100 
 
 
 In 1942, the Department of National Defence appropriated the entire 
Stoney Point Reserve under the War Measures Act, overriding the wishes of the 
Kettle Point and Stoney Point peoples, and not following the land surrender 
procedures in either the Indian Act or the Royal Proclamation.101  National Defence 
promised to return the land after the war, if it was no longer needed for military 
purposes, but still had possession of it when the Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry 
was released in 2007, long after its military utility had expired.102  The Inquiry 
concludes, “Unfortunately, the issues that were at the heart of the Ipperwash 
occupation remain unresolved by the federal government to this day.  This 
inexcusable delay and long neglect, by successive federal governments, are at the 
heart of the Ipperwash story.”103 
 
 
 Since Canada recognized in 1973 the right to bring comprehensive claims, 
comprehensive land claims agreements have been negotiated and signed between 
claimant First Nations, Canada and provincial or territorial authorities.  A 2009 
report by Canada listed 21 such agreements which had been ratified, covering 40% 
of Canada’s land mass.  According to that report, outstanding claims cover 
approximately 20% of Canada.  In contrast to the huge land mass involved in these 
outstanding entitlement issues, the numbers of Indigenous peoples are relatively 
small.  The 21 completed agreements involved over 91 communities with over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The Honourable Sidney B Linden, Commissioner, Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry (“Ipperwash”) 
(Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2007), Vol 1:  Investigation and Findings, at 671. 
99 Ipperwash, at 673, 685. 
100 Ipperwash, at 673, 685. 
101 Ipperwash, at 673. 
102 Ipperwash, at 673.  However, the government of Ontario announced in December of 2007 that it 
would return Ipperwash Park to the Chippewas of Kettle and Stoney Point.  Dickason, op cit supra note 
90, at 443. 
103 Ipperwash, at 685.  These two claims resulted in Commissions of Inquiry, but they are by no means 
the only long-standing cases of injustice perpetrated by Canada against First Peoples. 
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70,000 members, while the work in progress at the time of the 2009 report involved 
approximately 270 communities with approximately 200,000 members.104  A 2012 
report states that as of September 2012, there were 93 active self-government and 
comprehensive land claims negotiation tables across the country.105 
 
 
 Even if the Indigenous peoples involved work collectively, it is clear that 
the bargaining strength of any particular community or group on the one hand, and 
Canada on the other, cannot possibly be commensurate.  Human resource issues, as 
well as monetary resource issues, weigh heavily on small communities. Moreover, 
while often lengthy negotiations are under way, the communities must deal with all 
of the business of daily life, and often with pressure from resource exploration 
companies seeking to exploit the riches of the territories under discussion.  One is 
reminded of the circumstances confronting First Nations during the negotiation of 
the first round of land surrender Treaties, from 1763 onwards:  the pressure of 
would-be settlers and developers, and the dwindling vigour of traditional ways of 
providing a living, placed the First Nations under a comparative disadvantage at the 
bargaining table. 
 
 
 One of the main prizes for government of modern comprehensive land 
agreements is the surrender of First Nation title to their traditional lands.  This is 
one of the reasons that Indigenous scholar and activist Russ Diabo refers to the 
modern treaty process as the government’s “First Nations Termination Plan.”106 
Extinguishment of Aboriginal title, now as in the first round of treaty negotiations, 
is in keeping with the goals of the internal colonizer.  Even in the context of 
specific claims based on historical Treaties, one is still dealing with extinguishment 
issues; the modern First Nation is trying to realize, today, the terms of the historical 
bargain for surrender or extinguishment that was never fulfilled or was otherwise 
undermined by government action. 
 
 
 One can rightly ask, then, whether there is anything in the legal system 
now to protect Indigenous interests that was not available in the past, and if so, how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Impact Evaluation of Comprehensive Land Claim Agreements, 
February 17, 2009, at 5-6. 
105 Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, Fact Sheet:  Comprehensive Land Claims, 
September 2012, at 1, online: <http://www.aadncandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100016296/ 1100100016297>. A 
chart describing these 93 tables is at Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, Negotiation 
Tables (date modified 2012-03-19), online: <http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1346782327802/1346782485058>. 
106 Russell Diabo, “Harper Launches Major First Nations Termination Plan as Negotiating Tables 
Legitimize Canada’s Colonialism,” The Bullet, Socialist Project E-Bulletin No 756, January 10, 2012 
<http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/756.php>. 
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effective might these measures be. The most obvious new elements are the 
guarantees of rights in the Constitution Act, 1982.  Enforcement of those 
guarantees through the courts is time-consuming and expensive, however, and at 
the end of the day, the Court will itself be looking to continued negotiation between 
the Crown and First Nations as the ultimate solution.107  In such circumstances, 
how government behaves, and the extent of its commitment to reaching honourable 
settlements with Indigenous peoples, are key. Chief Justice Lamer in Delgamuukw 
states that the Crown is under a moral if not a legal duty to enter into and conduct 
those negotiations in good faith108. 
 
 
 In the administration of both the old and the new Treaties, and of the 
Indian Act, and in its other relations with Indigenous peoples, Canada is now – at 
least in theory -- subject to high standards of behaviour articulated by the Supreme 
Court.  The core of these standards is the honour of the Crown, a principle that 
servants of the Crown must conduct themselves with honour when acting on behalf 
of the sovereign.109 The Court traces the application of this principle in Indigenous 
law to the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 110 and states that its ultimate purpose is the 
reconciliation of pre-existing Indigenous sovereignty with assumed Crown 
sovereignty.111 
 
 
 In Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)112, the 
majority of the Court states that the honour of the Crown arises from the Crown’s 
assertion of sovereignty over an Indigenous people and the de facto control of land 
and resources that were formerly in the control of that people.113 The honour of the 
Crown recognizes the impact of the superimposition of European laws and customs 
on pre-existing Indigenous societies, which were “here first” and never conquered, 
but nonetheless made subject to a legal system which they did not share.  The 
historical treaties were framed in that unfamiliar legal system and negotiated and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 In R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, the Court found it significant that after Calder the federal 
government for the first time expressed a willingness to negotiate claims of Aboriginal title, and they 
went on to say that section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 “provides a solid base upon which 
subsequent negotiations can take place.” Paras 51, 53.  In Delgamuukw v BC, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para 
186 Chief Justice Lamer alludes to these comments, and expresses the wish that instead of proceeding to 
the retrial granted by the Court, the parties in Delgamuukw will enter into negotiations at which all with 
potential interests in the land can be represented. 
108 At para 186. 
109 Manitoba Metis Federation Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 SCC 14, at para 65 (“Manitoba 
Metis”). 
110 Manitoba Metis para 66. 
111 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 SCR 511 at para 20 and Metis para 
66. 
112 Loc cit note 109. 
113 Manitoba Metis, at para 66 citations omitted. 
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drafted in a foreign language.114 The majority states, “The honour of the Crown 
characterizes the ‘special relationship’ that arises out of this colonial practice”,115 
and specifically adopts the following passage from Professor Brian Slattery: 
 
…when the Crown claimed sovereignty over Canadian territories and 
ultimately gained factual control over them, it did so in the face of pre-
existing Aboriginal sovereignty and territorial rights.  The tension 
between these conflicting claims gave rise to a special relationship 
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, which requires the Crown to 
deal honourably with Aboriginal peoples.116 
 
 The honour of the Crown has been applied by the Supreme Court in 
several situations, with the caution that it gives rise to different duties in different 
circumstances.117 Treaties will be interpreted generously and enforced in a way that 
upholds the honour of the Crown.118  Interpretation of statutes as well as Treaties 
must be approached in a manner which maintains the integrity of the Crown; it is 
always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises, and no appearance of 
“sharp dealing” will be sanctioned.119 The Crown must act in a way that 
accomplishes the intended purpose of Treaty and statutory grants.120 Negotiation of 
Treaties, similarly, is to be conducted in accordance with the honour of the Crown. 
121The honour of the Crown informs the purposive interpretation of section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982122; the way in which a legislative objective is to be 
attained must uphold the honour of the Crown.123 The government’s duty to consult 
with Indigenous peoples and accommodate their interests when the Crown 
contemplates an action that will affect a claimed but as yet unproven interest is also 
grounded in the honour of the Crown.124 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Manitoba Metis, para 67 (quote marks and specific references to the cases cited in this paragraph 
have been omitted). 
115 Manitoba Metis, para 67, cite omitted. 
116 “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown,” (2005) 29 SCLR (2d) 433, at 436, quoted in 
Manitoba Metis at para 67. 
117 Haida, para 18. 
118 Binnie J. in Mitchell v Canada (MNR), [2001] SCR 911 at para 138. 
119 R v Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771, at para 41. 
120 Manitoba Metis, at para 73 (4). 
121 Haida, at para 20; Manitoba Metis, at para 73 (3). 
122 Manitoba Metis, at para 73 (1). 
123 Badger, at para 78, quoting Sparrow at page 1110. 
124 Haida, para 16; Manitoba Metis, para 73 (2). 
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 One particular application of the honour of the Crown was first established 
in the Guerin125 case, decided in 1984..  Where the Crown has assumed 
discretionary control over specific Aboriginal interests, the honour of the Crown 
gives rise to a fiduciary duty, which requires that the Crown act in the groups’ best 
interests in exercising its discretionary control.126 In Guerin, Canada was acting to 
secure a lease of reserve land which had been surrendered to it for that purpose, and 
accepted a lease on terms that were unfavourable to the Band, and contrary to what 
it had authorized.  The Court found that a “sui generis” fiduciary relationship 
existed between Canada and the Band, in law; until this “watershed decision”, 
courts had characterized any trust relationship between the Crown and a Band as a 
political trust only, not enforceable in court.127 The source of the fiduciary 
relationship in Guerin was found in the Band’s aboriginal title to its land, 
inalienable except upon surrender to the Crown, a feature common to both the 
Royal Proclamation and the Indian Act. While identifying the relationship as a 
fiduciary one, however, the Court makes clear that not all of the obligations arising 
between the parties to a fiduciary relationship are themselves fiduciary in nature, 
saying that the Crown’s fiduciary duty towards Indigenous peoples varies with the 
nature and importance of the interest sought to be protected.128 
 
 
 In Sparrow, the Court states that Guerin grounds a general guiding 
principle for section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982:  the government has the 
responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to Aboriginal peoples, in a 
relationship that is trust-like rather than adversarial129.  Reading section 91(24) of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 with section 35, interpreted this way, means that 
“federal power must be reconciled with federal duty”.130 
 The most recent decision of the Supreme Court to consider and apply the 
principle of honour of the Crown is Manitoba Metis.  The Court granted a 
declaration that the federal government failed to implement in accordance with the 
honour of the Crown the land grant provision set out in section 31 of the Manitoba 
Act, 1870 , providing for timely allocation of 1.4 million acres of land to the 
children of Metis in Manitoba at confederation.131  It holds that the honour of the 
Crown is engaged by an explicit obligation to an Indigenous group that is enshrined 
in the constitution132, and in that situation, the honour of the Crown requires that it 
take a broad purposive approach to the interpretation of the promise, and act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Guerin v Canada, [1984] 2 SCR 335. 
126 Haida, para 18 and Manitoba Metis para 73 (1). 
127 Wewaykum, at para 73. 
128 Guerin, at paras 83, 86. 
129 Sparrow, at para 59. 
130 Sparrow, at para 62; Manitoba Metis at 69. 
131 Manitoba Metis, para 154. 
132 Manitoba Metis para 70. 
[2013] STILL COLONIZING 
	  
	  
	  
145 
diligently to fulfil it.133 While acknowledging that “implementation, in the way of 
human affairs, may be imperfect”, the Court states that “..a persistent pattern of 
errors and indifference that substantially frustrates the purposes of a solemn 
promise may amount to a betrayal of the Crown’s duty to act honourably in 
fulfilling the promise.”134 
 
 
 Although the events giving rise to the obligation, and the claim, took place 
over a hundred years before, the Court refuses to hold that the claim is barred under 
provincial limitations acts.  Characterizing the issue as a constitutional grievance, 
the Court states that: 
 
So long as the issue remains outstanding, the goal of reconciliation and 
constitutional harmony, recognized in s.35 of the Charter and underlying 
s.31 of the Manitoba Act, remains unachieved.  The ongoing rift in the 
national fabric that s.31 was adopted to cure remains unremedied.  The 
unfinished business of reconciliation of the Metis people with Canadian 
sovereignty is a matter of national and constitutional import.  The courts 
are the guardians of the Constitution and, …cannot be barred by mere 
statutes from issuing a declaration on a fundamental constitutional matter.  
The principles of legality, constitutionality and the rule of law demand no 
less:  see Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, at para. 
72135 
 
 
 So, too, the Court rejects Canada’s argument that the claim is barred by 
the doctrine of laches.  It holds that the required element of acquiescence in 
Canada’s conduct is not present:  “In the context of this case – including the 
historical injustices suffered by the Metis, the imbalance of power that followed 
Crown sovereignty, and the negative consequences following delays in allocating 
the land grants – delay by itself cannot be interpreted as…acquiescence or 
waiver.”136 
 
 
 These doctrinal developments relating to the honour of the Crown sound 
encouraging.  However, they leave me deeply cynical and discouraged.  Under our 
constitution, the Crown is an arm of government, and the powers and duties of the 
Crown do not vary with the personality or inclinations of any particular 
monarchical incumbent.  Canada was a monarchy, with limited responsible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Manitoba Metis para 75. 
134 Manitoba Metis, para 82.  The Court also refers to the Crown’s repeated mistakes and inaction that 
persisted for more than a decade (para 128) and persistent inattention (para 110). 
135 Manitoba Metis, at 140. 
136 Manitoba Metis, at 147. 
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government and limited autonomy, before it became an independent modern state.  
The doctrine upon which the Court’s modern honour of the Crown jurisprudence is 
based is old doctrine.  In Mikesew Cree, Binnie J. notes that the honour of the 
Crown was first referred to as a treaty obligation by Gwynne J. of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in 1895137.  While it is beyond the reach of this paper to document 
all of the instances where the Crown’s behaviour fell below the standards now 
being articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada, the record verifies that these 
were numerous, and include contemporary examples as well as historical ones.138 
The policy expressed in the White Paper, of disdain for important Treaty 
obligations, manifests how badly the honour of the Crown was wanting in its 
dealings with obligations under Treaties it had signed to open Ontario, the prairies 
and the northwest for settlement and development. 
 
 
 There remains much land acquisition business underway in Canada; the 
modern land claims agreements affect about 60% of our land mass.  What 
assurances can we have that the modern Crown, even with the clear instructions 
from the Supreme Court of Canada, will behave appreciably better than the Crown 
of past decades?  And if the Crown in right of Canada and the provinces does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Mikesew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 SCR 388, at para 
51, citing Province of Ontario v Dominion of Canada (1895), 25 SCR 434 at pages 511-12. Although he 
acknowledges that Gwynne J. was dissenting in the result, Binnie J. states “nothing was said by the 
majority in that case to doubt that the honour of the Crown was pledged to the fulfillment of its 
obligations to the Indians.”  Mikesew, at para 51. 
138 In addition to the examples already provided, see Whitefish Lake Band of Indians v Attorney General 
of Canada, 2007 ONCA at 744, at paras 1, 2, 9, 14-21.  The Whitefish Lake Band, a signatory to the 
Robinson Huron Treaty in 1850, surrendered timber rights on its reserve to the Crown in 1886.  The 
Crown sold these rights to a Conservative member of the provincial legislature, under value, and the 
licence was then flipped twice for successively higher prices.  The Crown kept renewing the licences 
until the timber was virtually exhausted.  There was considerable political furor at the time about the 
“swindle” of the Indians.  However, it was not until 2005, a week before the trial of an action for 
damages brought by Whitefish, that the Crown admitted to breaching its fiduciary duty in 1886 by 
failing to obtain fair value for the timber licence.  Whitefish still had to proceed to trial, and to appeal, 
before eventually overcoming the Crown’s argument for a very low valuation to be placed on the 
licence. In Joseph et al v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (Ministry of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development) 2008 FC 574, the Hagwilget Indian Band enjoyed a natural salmon fishery 
caused by a rock fall on the river where it had made its home for generations (though only made a 
reserve in 1938).  In 1959, over the objection of the Hagwilget, the federal Department of Fisheries 
blasted the rock in the canyon, destroying the fishery. The government did nothing to provide 
compensation for the destruction, and the Hagwilget started litigation in 1985. In 1997, the Hagwilget 
accepted to enter the specific claims process, but were told in 2001 that the claim could not be resolved 
in anything less than 20 years, and so they revived their action.  The Crown tried unsuccessfully to have 
the claim struck, and then persuaded the Hagwilget to enter into negotiations in 2006, although the 
Crown had no negotiating mandate.  Having exhausted its resources and gone deeply into debt, the 
Hagwilget Band applied successfully to the Federal Court for an order of advance costs so that it could 
continue its litigation. The Court stated that the Crown’s behaviour raised serious questions about the 
honour of the Crown; “for over 25 years the plaintiffs were continuously put off by a series of unkept 
and broken promises that the situation would somehow be remedied” (at 21), then they were 
“sidetracked” into the special claims process (at 21), and then the Crown tried to get them to negotiate, 
an “extraordinary” move given that the Crown is “nowhere near to giving proper instructions and a 
mandate to counsel to enter into meaningful negotiations.” (at 23). 
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behave in accordance with these standards, what recourse is available to the 
comparatively small and powerless First Nations that must deal with Canada and a 
province or territory in modern negotiations?  How can a First Nation or group of 
First Nations not only deal with the negotiation or specific claims process but also 
respond to third party, primarily corporate, initiatives to claim and develop land to 
which the First Nation has a historic claim?  The transaction costs of the 
negotiations or litigation that would be necessary to enforce the Crown’s duty of 
honourable behaviour are huge, and can easily exhaust resources that would 
otherwise be spent on the basics of daily life, like housing, health and education.  
Even if litigation is successful, like the Manitoba Metis case, or Delgamuukw, the 
reward for success is the opportunity to spend more time at the negotiation tables, 
at a pace determined in some considerable measure by Canada. Recently, for 
example, Canada has announced that it will concentrate on negotiations that are the 
“most productive”, leaving the less productive negotiations to languish;139 that 
message, as well as Canada’s overall yearly budget for land settlements, has a 
profound impact on the negotiating process. 
 
 
 The Court’s anxiety about the past conduct of the Crown is evident in its 
jurisprudence on the honour of the Crown.  The Court emphasizes that honourable 
behaviour is necessary in order to promote reconciliation of Crown sovereignty 
with the prior occupation (and in some cases it even says prior sovereignty) of the 
Indigenous peoples.  The Court knows that dishonourable behaviour by the Crown, 
at least in theory, tarnishes its exercise of the sovereignty it claims. While it did not 
achieve this sovereignty by conquest, dishonourable behaviour is the behaviour of a 
conqueror not an erstwhile ally.  I believe that the Court is right about the moral 
jeopardy into which dishonourable behaviour puts Crown and indeed Canadian 
sovereignty over Indigenous lands and peoples. Dishonourable Crown behaviour 
confirms Indigenous resistance to the assertion of Crown sovereignty, and 
eventually it will bring non-Indigenous people, in great numbers, to resist 
dishonourable acts done by the government as their representative.  It is only if, and 
when, the government itself begins to appreciate that moral jeopardy, and believe 
that it is important to prevent it, that we will see honourable conduct from the 
Crown on a consistent basis, as a matter of government priority. 
 
 
 Meanwhile, the Crown in its modern dress will continue to work towards 
completion of one element of its agenda of internal colonization, namely securing 
the surrender to it of Indigenous lands, and extinguishment of Indigenous title.  The 
conditions of that work, for both Crown and Indigenous peoples, will be little 
different from what they were during the first round of Treaty making which ended 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, Result-Based Approach to Treaty and Self-
Government Negotiations, online: <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1346437606032/ 
1346437640078>. 
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in 1923.  This is because there is almost no practical way, short of a transformative 
vision on the part of the Crown, to get it to behave on a regular basis with the kind 
of honour contemplated by the case law. 
 
 
INTERNAL COLONIZATION WRIT SMALL:  LAND UNDER THE INDIAN ACT AND THE 
DEFINITION OF INDIAN 
 
Canada’s imposition of the Indian Act, without regard to the underlying 
constitutional imperatives affecting the relationship of Indigenous peoples with the 
state, has resulted in a permanent, and continuing exposure of Indigenous peoples 
to the oppressions of internal colonialism.  The Indian Act not only facilitates the 
continuing erosion of the small interests in land still held by those subject to it. It is 
a device for gradually reducing the numbers of those whom the government is 
prepared to recognize as “Indian”.  In the end, even if there remain “lands reserved 
for Indians” there may well be no “Indians” eligible to inhabit them. 
 
 
 The enfranchisement scheme started in 1857 highlights several aspects of 
colonial policy towards Indigenous peoples which are still with us, embedded in the 
Indian Act. One of the most enduring is the use of legislation to define who is an 
Indian.  Before the 1857 legislation, reference to “Indians” in legislation was very 
broad and seemed to reflect Indigenous practice140.  With the introduction of 
enfranchisement, with its notion that one could become non-Indian by having 
certain attainments, it became necessary to define the starting point of this 
transformation, that is, who was an Indian.141  The connection between being 
defined as an Indian and having an interest in land on reserve was also foundational 
to the enfranchisement scheme, and this link would continue to characterize the 
Indian Act.  In the White Paper, Canada states that as long as the Crown controls 
the land for the benefit of the bands who use and occupy it, the Crown is 
responsible for determining who may, as a member of a band, share that band 
land.142 
 
 
 Another dimension of the Indian definition established in the 
enfranchisement scheme was the primacy given to the male.  Enfranchisement was 
only available to male Indians; only their attainments were scrutinized, and only 
they received fee simple title if successfully enfranchised.  When her husband was 
enfranchised, however, a woman would also lose her Indian status, as would the 
couple’s children, but neither the wife nor the children would take any interest in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 See, for example, An act for the better protection of the Lands and Property of the Indians in Lower 
Canada, S Prov C 1850, c 42 (10th August 1850), discussed below. 
141 JR Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens:  A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada, rev ed 
(“Skyscrapers”) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989) at 111, describes this as a paradox: first 
define who the non-citizens are, and then define how to become a citizen. 
142 White Paper, at 12. 
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land. This exclusive focus on the male Indian for purposes of determining the 
Indian-ness of his wife and children would continue until 1985. 
 
 
 Not surprisingly, voluntary enfranchisement was never a success.  The 
Chiefs of Canada West had made it clear in 1846 that they did not want provisions 
that would allow conversion of band lands held in common to individual fee simple 
parcels,143 and Indians protested against the 1857 Act itself.144  Only one Indian 
enfranchised between 1857 and the first Indian Act in 1876145.  Between 1857 and 
1920 only 250 individuals enfranchised.146 
The failure of voluntary enfranchisement provoked legislation in 1920 to make it 
compulsory.147  The involuntary provision was repealed by a new government in 
1922 148, then restored in 1933, finally to be removed in 1951.149  After 1951, very 
few Indians chose to be enfranchised150.  There were 228 voluntary 
enfranchisements of men and women between 1965 and 1975151 and only 11 
voluntary adult enfranchisements from 1973 to 1976.152  In 1960, registered Indians 
living on reserves had finally been given the vote in federal elections,153 and so it is 
unlikely that those enfranchising after that date were doing it to get the vote. 
 
 
 The impact on reserve lands of enfranchisement was never seriously tested 
because of the unpopularity of the measure.  Experience with the General 
Allocation Act (Dawes Act) in effect in the United States from 1887 to 1934 
clearly suggests, however, that the success of enfranchisement in Canada would 
have reduced the overall acreage of land available to reserves154.  The Dawes Act 
provided for fee simple interests in reserve land and Flanagan observes that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Skyscrapers, at 112. 
144 Skyscrapers, at 113. 
145 Skyscrapers, at 113. 
146 Skyscrapers, at 190. 
147 Op cit supra, note 32, at 233. 
148 Op cit supra, note 32, at 234. 
149 Op cit supra, note 32, at 238. 
150 Kathleen Jamieson, Indian Women and the Law: Citizens Minus (Canadian Advisory Council on the 
Status of Women; Indian Rights for Indian Women, April 1978), (“Jamieson”) at 63. 
151 Jamieson, at 63. 
152 Jamieson, 64. 
153 Op cit supra note 3. 
154 Flanagan et al, op cit supra note 2, at  42-52. 
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“main real-world effects” of 67 years of that legislation was to reduce the size of 
Indian reservations by half.155 
 
 
 Experience in the Canadian prairies with the issuance of land scrip, “a 
type of promissory note for land”156, also suggests that individual interests in 
reserve land would have proven more vulnerable than land held collectively. 
Between the negotiation of Treaty 1 and the signing of Treaty 11, the government 
of Canada carried out thirteen “scrip commissions” that issued to Metis people land 
and money scrip amounting to $2,888,157 in the currency of the day.157  These 
scrip commissions were issuing scrip as a way of extinguishing any claims to land 
title which the Prairie Metis might have had, and the land scrip could be traded in 
for land.  However, Miller observes of this process, “as far as the Metis were 
concerned they had little to show for the effort.”158  In Saskatchewan, scrip buyers, 
often representing banks, followed the Treaty Commissioners and offered cash at a 
discounted rate in exchange for scrip that was signed over to them.159  “The land 
that scrip was supposed to represent rarely ended up in Metis hands and they did 
not assemble a land base of any sort.”160 
 
 
 At confederation, Canada pledged 1.4 million acres of land to be allocated 
to the children of Metis then living in Manitoba, to give them a head start on 
becoming established in the face of the looming influx of settlers competing for 
land.  Long delays in allocating the land meant that “many Metis sold potential 
interests for too little”161, with the price for land after it had been allocated being 
twice what could be gained from selling the entitlement only.162  Some children, 
left out of the land allocation process, received scrip only, which was sold for cash 
on the open market and received about ½ of its face value.163 In Metis, the Supreme 
Court found that government behaviour contrary to the honour of the Crown 
contributed to the disadvantage experienced by the Metis.  In any scheme to divide 
reserve holdings into individual fee simple parcels, government is bound to be 
involved, and history has shown that it is imprudent simply to assume, or trust, that 
government will adhere to high standards of behaviour. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Flanagan et al, at 51. 
156 Op cit supra note 32 at 193. 
157 Op cit supra note 32 at 227. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Op cit supra note 32 at 206. 
160 Op cit supra note 32 at 207. 
161 Manitoba Metis, at para 110. 
162 Manitoba Metis, at para 116. 
163 Manitoba Metis, at para 118. 
[2013] STILL COLONIZING 
	  
	  
	  
151 
 
 The desire to establish individualized fee simple interests in reserve land 
surfaced again in the White Paper, as a way of giving Indians the same rights and 
treatment in law as other Canadians.  The Red Paper issued by the Alberta chiefs 
rejected the sameness as equality argument, declaring that “equality in fact may 
involve the necessity of different treatment.”164  The Chiefs also challenged 
Canada’s argument that individualized fee simple interests were necessary to 
unlock the economic potential of reserve lands.  Canada had argued that 
government ownership of Indian reserves blocked their beneficial economic 
exploitation. The Red Paper argued that the government does not “own” Indian 
reserves, but merely holds them in trust for the bands which are their beneficial 
owners.165  It also stated that the government wrongly assumes that Indians can 
control their land only if they take ownership the way ordinary property is 
owned.166  The chiefs contended that the Indian Act could, instead, be changed to 
give Indians control of their lands without changing the fact that the land is  being 
held in trust.167  As far as I have been able to determine, there never has been a 
satisfactory rejoinder to the simple basic point that the Indian Act could be changed 
to unlock economic potential of reserve land without going all the way to 
individualized fee simple title. 
 
 
 The Red Paper’s arguments work just as well against the contemporary 
advocates of the First Nations Property Ownership Act.168  The unwillingness to 
explore thoroughly what means might be developed to foster commerce on reserve 
land without giving up its collective character suggests to me that proponents of the 
fee simple option are not necessarily interested in the collective wellbeing of the 
First Nation, or even the welfare of the individual holder of fee simple.  Rather, 
these proponents seem to be fixing on fee simple title because it is a bedrock of 
modern financing, and thus meshes easily with the established practices of the 
commercial interests which command their real loyalty and attention.  The 
proponents of fee simple seem to want to make the capital value of reserve land 
(and resources) available to third parties seeking to exploit the land for commercial 
benefit, without making them invest in innovative and perhaps riskier methods of 
taking security for monies advanced.  The fee simple option may also appeal to the 
state itself, not just because of its interest in business and resource development, 
but because revenues from the use or disposal of fee simple land interests are easier 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Red Paper, at 5. 
165 Red Paper, at 9. 
166 Red Paper at 10. 
167 Red Paper, at 10. 
168 Flanagan et al, at 29. 
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to find and tax than revenue from some more collective deployment of assets might 
be.169 
 
 
 The First Nations Property Ownership Act has not collected, so far, a 
strong enough following to ensure its passage.170  This does not mean that Canada 
has lacked other means of disposing of interests in reserve land, to the benefit of 
third parties or the Crown itself.  Surrenders, sales, leases, and other means have 
been in the Indian Act repertoire from the outset. Indigenous peoples have learned 
the hard way that sorrow and loss for them, and financial profit for white 
colonizers, has been the result of engagement with the “dynamic market 
economy”171 .  For now, without fee simple interests in land as yet another tool of 
exploitation, it is on the tried and true ways of reducing the size of reserve land that 
Canada’s colonizing efforts must continue to rely. 
 
 
 However, one final colonizing strategy remains to be considered.   We 
will find that it is still a robust means of internal colonization, because of its 
usefulness in making Indians disappear, even without giving them any land at all to 
take away with them. 
 
 
“INDIANS” DEFINED, AND DEFINED AWAY 
 
James Tully identifies making Indians extinct in fact as one of the strategies of 
internal colonialism; a related one is to weaken their resistance to being 
assimilated. Tully’s formulation recalls to mind the well-known statement of 
Duncan Campbell Scott, Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs, in 1920, when he 
explained to Parliament why he wanted to make enfranchisement compulsory: 
 
I want to get rid of the Indian problem….Our objective is to continue until 
there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the 
body politic, and there is no Indian question and no Indian department and 
that is the whole object of this Bill. 172 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 It has also been suggested that government likes the fee simple option because it would be easier to 
overcome individual owners’ resistance to an unpopular project like the Northern Gateway Pipeline than 
to overcome the collective resistance of First Nations: Editorial, “Property rights not a priority,” The 
Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, August 11, 2012, at A 10. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Tom Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2000) 
at 131. 
172 Evidence of Duncan Campbell Scott before the Committee of the House of Commons considering 
“Bill 14”, later enacted as An Act to amend the Indian Act, chapter 26, 12-13 George V (assented to June 
28, 1922). Quoted in E Brian Titley, A Narrow Vision:  Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration 
of Indian Affairs in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1986) at 50, fn 55. 
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 While actual death and extinction did play a role in the reduction of 
Indigenous populations in Canada173, an arguably larger role was played by a form 
of “desk murder”174: being defined out of existence by Indian department 
bureaucrats and Canadian legislators.  While arguing that a definition of “Indian” 
was necessary in order to identify those entitled to access Indian lands175, the 
Canadian government constructed the term very narrowly, and in accordance with 
its own, not Indigenous, concepts of kinship. 
 
 
 The number of claimants to “Indian” status (that debased version of 
Indigeneity which was all that Canada was prepared to recognize) was accordingly 
much smaller than it might have been if Indigenous peoples had been able to use 
their own definitions, or even if the definitions first used by colonial governments 
had persisted.  The goal of Indian policy well into the twentieth century was to 
assimilate, or “civilize” the Indians; presumably, anyone whose Indian-ness was 
legislatively “defined away” could be considered “civilized” and thus became a 
statistic on the plus side of the assimilation ledger. 
 
 
 The original colonial definition of “Indian” was a fairly broad one.  Lower 
Canadian legislation in 1850, for example, had four categories of “Indians”: (1) all 
persons of Indian blood (not further defined or specified as to “quantum”) reputed 
to belong to the particular Body or Tribe of Indians interested in the lands at issue, 
and their descendants; (2) all persons intermarried with any such Indians and 
residing amongst them (including men intermarried with Indigenous women), and 
all descendants of such persons; (3) all persons residing among such Indians, whose 
parents on either side (fathers and mothers) were or are Indians of such Body or 
Tribe, or entitled to be considered as such; and (4) all persons adopted in infancy 
by any such Indians, and residing in the Village or upon the lands of such Tribe or 
Body of Indians and their descendants.176 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Bonita Lawrence, op cit supra note 10 at 34-35. 
174 The term was used by Israeli Attorney General Gideon Hausner, the Chief Prosecutor of Adolf 
Eichmann at his  trial, to describe the activities of Eichmann and other bureaucrats of the Nazi 
Holocaust, who issued from their offices the orders for rounding up, transportation, and other activities 
that resulted in the slaughter of European Jewry in the death camps.  David Cesarini, Becoming 
Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, Crimes and Trial of a “Desk Murderer” (Cambridge:  DaCapo Press, 
2006) at 3, 6. 
175 An argument still being made as late as 1969 in the White Paper. 
176 An Act for the better protection of the Lands and Property of the Indians in Lower Canada, S Prov C 
1850, c 42 (10th August 1850), s V.  An Act for the protection of the Indians in Upper Canada from 
imposition, and the property owned or enjoyed by them from trespass and injury, S Prov C 1850, c 74 
(10th August 1850) simply referred to Indians and those intermarried with Indians (s X). 
 UNB LJ     RD UN-B      [VOL/TOME 64] 
	  
154 
 
 This definition was restricted quite substantially the next year177.  By 
1876, when the  first comprehensive Indian Act in post-Confederation Canada was 
passed, the term Indian was narrowly defined as (1) any male person of Indian 
blood reputed to belong to a particular band; (2) any child of such person; and (3) 
any woman who is or was lawfully married to such person.178 
Until 1985179, eligibility to be considered an “Indian” for purposes of the Indian 
Act180 descended through the male line, even though matrilineal descent and 
matrifocal family and kinship structures were a feature of many Indigenous nations.  
Under this system a child would derive Indian status from his or her father181.  A 
status Indian woman who was unmarried could pass status to her child, only if it 
could not be established that the father of the child was a non-Indian.182 
 
 
 A man could confer Indian status on his non-Indian wife.  However, from 
1869 to 1985, a woman would lose her entitlement to registration if she married a 
non-Indian male.183  With no Indian father to bestow it, the children of such unions 
would be ineligible for Indian status. There are no statistics to show how many 
women and children were affected by these provisions, but I have noted elsewhere 
that over 110,000 persons who had lost status this way regained eligibility for 
registration under Bill C-31, passed in 1985.184 
 
 
 Until the Indian Act of 1951, a woman who married a non-Indian man 
might not be totally excluded from her community.  If she did not opt to accept 
“commutation” of her interest in Band funds (which entailed a lump sum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 An Act to repeal in part and to amend an Act, intituled, An Act for the better protection of the Lands 
and property of the Indians in Lower Canada, S Prov C 1851, (30th August 1851), s II.  The amendment 
dropped the category of infants adopted by the Indians, and restricted the acquisition of Indian status by 
marriage to women “lawfully married” to Indians, excluding altogether the husbands of Indian women. 
178 The Indian Act, 1876, s 3(3). 
179 Bill C-31, op cit supra note 3. 
180 Which I call “Indian status” here, in keeping with relatively common usage, although this is not a 
term used in the Indian Act 
181 In Martin v Chapman, [1983] 1 SCR 365, a male born out of wedlock to a status Indian father and 
non-Indian mother was permitted to be registered under s 11(1)(c) of the Indian Act because he was a 
male person who is a direct descendant of a male status Indian.  The fact that he was “illegitimate” did 
not prevent his registration.  However, a female child in the same circumstances would not be registered. 
182 For the last version of the legislation before its change in 1985, see Indian Act, SC 1951, c 29, s 11. 
183 The most infamous version of this provision, which had existed since 1876, is the one found in 
section 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act, SC 1951, c 29.  It was this section that faced the legal challenges 
which eventually led to the repeal of this provision. 
184 See Mary Eberts, “McIvor: Justice Delayed – Again,” (2010) 9:1 Indigenous Law J 15-46, at 21-22 
and note 25. 
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payment),185 she might still remain on the Band list, and if her Band had signed a 
treaty, she would remain eligible for treaty rights.  Some Indian agents would issue 
“red ticket” identity cards to such women, identifying them as Indian for purposes 
of some Band benefits and treaty money.186  However, this loophole was closed in 
the l951 legislation, which provided that a woman who married a non-Indian could 
be involuntarily enfranchised by order-in-council.187  The woman’s minor children 
would be enfranchised with her, even if her non-Indian husband was not their 
father.188  In 1956, the “red ticket” loophole was also closed, and women were 
required to accept a lump sum payment and deprived of their remaining ties with 
their Band.189 
 
 
 Women who were compulsorily enfranchised for marrying a non-Indian 
formed by far the largest cadre of Indians who experienced enfranchisement. In 
1965 to 1975, just over 5000 women and children were involuntarily 
enfranchised190, and from 1973 to 1976 when the practice was ended 
administratively, there were 1,335 involuntary adult enfranchisements.191  
Enfranchisment did not bring these adults the right to vote in Canadian elections; 
they had already received it in 1960.  It did not earn them the fee simple interest in 
reserve land which voluntary enfranchisement brought to male Indians, but only 
ensured their complete exile from their home communities. As non-Indians, they 
were now forbidden by the Indian Act192 from even coming onto the reserve, let 
alone living there. Yet, this compulsory enfranchisement was, in some ways, the 
consummate act of colonizing:  the women and children were removed from the 
Indian register, and thus no longer part of the Indian problem so decried by Duncan 
Campbell Scott.  They had been assimilated, dare I say “civilized”, not gradually 
but at the stroke of a pen. 
 
 
 This highly discriminatory treatment of women under the Indian Act 
became a focus of Indigenous women’s activism in the 1970s, through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Jamieson, at 62. 
186 Jamieson, at 61. 
187 Indian Act, SC 1951, c 149, s 109(1)(2), KJ 91. 
188 Jamieson, at 91. This enfranchisement of the children continued until a legislative amendment in 
1956: SC l956, c 40, s 26.   
189 Jamieson, at 62; SC 1956, c 40, s 6(5). 
190 Jamieson gives the number as 5,035 at 63. 
191 Jamieson, at 64. The practice did not end by statute until passage of Bill C-31.  See supra note 3. 
192 Because reserves were lands set aside for the use and benefit of Indians, a non-Indian could not come 
on a reserve, and might be charged with trespass if she did.  See the original provision in SC 1876, c 18, 
s 11. 
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organizations like Indian Rights for Indian Women and the Native Women’s 
Association of Canada. Two high-profile Court cases challenged the provisions 
which deprived a woman of Indian status upon marriage to a non-Indian.  The first 
of these, brought by Ojibway Jeannette Lavell and Mohawk Yvonne Bedard of 
Ontario under the equality before the law guarantee of the Canadian Bill of Rights, 
was unsuccessful in the Supreme Court of Canada.193 Sandra Lovelace, a Maliseet 
woman from New Brunswick, took the issue to the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee and secured a ruling that the provision violated the UN Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.194 The equality guarantees of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, entrenched in the constitution in 1982, were scheduled to 
come into effect in 1985.195  The pressure of the Lovelace ruling, and the coming 
into force of the equality guarantees, produced amendments to the Indian Act in the 
form of Bill C-31196, a term which is still used colloquially to describe this package 
of legislative changes. 
 
 
 Bill C-31 provided for the reinstatement to Indian status of women who 
had been deprived of status by reason of their marriage to non-Indian men, and also 
cancelled the “enfranchisement” of these women where it had been forced on them.  
It also provided that their children could be returned to status.  However, these 
welcome changes were set in an overall legislative framework that deprived them 
of their full force.  Bill C-31 provided that henceforth, a child would be registered 
as an Indian only if both of her parents were Indian.  This two-parent requirement 
for status was not the only policy choice available:  the government could have 
continued the system which required only one parent to be a status Indian, but 
made it possible for both the mother and the father to convey status.  Instead, it 
replaced the privilege of the male parent with a requirement that both parents be 
Indian in order to convey status. This choice made it more difficult to secure Indian 
status, and would contribute to a lessening of the status Indian population in the 
not-so-distant future.197 
 
 
 Under the 1985 legislation, a child could derive status from one Indian 
parent, but that concession would only happen once in a line of descent.  A child 
who had herself derived status from one Indian parent could not, as a single parent, 
pass that status along. This provision, known colloquially as “the second generation 
cut-off” was particularly hard on the children of women who had lost status for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 AG Canada v Lavell; Bedard v Isaac et al, [1974] SCR 1349. 
194 Lovelace v Canada, Communication No R 6/24, UN Doc Supp No 40 (A/36/40) (1981) (UN Human 
Rights Committee). 
195 Section 32(3) of Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to Canada Act, 1982, 1982, c 11 (UK). 
196 Supra, note 3. 
197 See Megan Furi & Jill Wherrett, Indian Status and Band Membership Issues (Ottawa:  Library of 
Parliament, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, BP-410E, February 1966 (rev. Feb. 2003), 
cited in Eberts, op. cit. supra note 184, footnotes 23 and 131. 
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marrying out. Those children could not pass their status on to their own children 
unless the other parent of those children was also a status Indian. 
 
 
 Sharon McIvor, of the Lower Nicola Band of British Columbia, and her 
son Jacob Grismer, challenged the preference for male parents in the pre-1985 
Indian Act, winning a partial victory.198  Although the trial court had been prepared 
to find unconstitutional the whole history of the Act’s preference for the male 
parent, the Court of Appeal chose a much narrower ground for its finding, based on 
a legislative peculiarity called the “double mother” rule.  Under the old Act, for a 
short period of time, a person would lose Indian status at 21 if both his mother and 
his grandmother had been non-status women who had gained status by marrying a 
status male. The BC Court of Appeal considered this to be discrimination against 
the child of a woman who lost status by marrying –out, as that child had been 
deprived of status right away, and the child with the “double mothers” had had one 
additional generation of opportunity to secure status. 
 
 
 Following this convoluted, and highly unpopular, ruling by the BC Court 
of Appeal, the government of Canada responded with a small legislative 
amendment. 199 It permitted the grandchildren of women restored to status by Bill 
C-31 to be registered as Indians with only one Indian parent.  The “second 
generation cutoff” was, in effect, dropped down one more generation for those 
children.  It is estimated that up to 45,000 children could benefit from this 
amendment.200 
 
 
 The two-parent rule installed by Bill C-31 has had another substantially 
negative effect on the ability of persons to be registered as Indians.  The 
government interprets the two-parent rule to require that the identities of both a 
child’s parents be known, and their Indian status confirmed, before it will register 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 McIvor v The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2007 BCSC 827 and 2007 BCSC 
1712, reversed in part by McIvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs) 2009 BCCA 153, 
leave to appeal to SCC denied 11.05.2009 SCC Case Information Docket 33201, 2009.11.05 online:  
Supreme Court of Canada, <http://www.scc-cs.cgc.ca>. Supplementary Reasons of BCCA (Extension of 
Suspension of Declaration of Invalidity), 2009 BCCA 153 (April 1, 2010).  Sharon McIvor and her son 
Jacob Grismer have now taken proceedings before the UN Human Rights Committee:  Sharon McIvor 
and Jacob Grismer v Canada, Communication Submitted for Consideration under the First Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, September 24, 2010; Canada 
replied on August 22, 2011, and McIvor and Grismer responded on December 5, 2011 in 
Communication No 2020/2010.  
199 An act to promote gender equality in Indian registration, SC 2010, c 18 (in force January 31, 2011). 
200 Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Estimate of Demographic Implications 
from Indian Registration Amendment, McIvor v Canada (March 10, 2010), <http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/eng/1100100032515>. 
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the child under the two-parent rule.  This administrative rule puts a premium on the 
father’s good will and co-operation; where he is abusive, unknown or absent, or 
does not want to incur a support obligation, or the child has been born of rape, 
infidelity or incest it may be difficult or impossible to put his name forward with 
the child’s application for registration. Sometimes, the absence of his name from 
the registration particulars could be just the result of an inability to navigate the 
department’s paperwork.  Without the father’s registration particulars, a single 
woman will be able to register her child only under s. 6(2). A mother who is, 
herself, the child of only one status Indian parent and thus registered under s.6(2), 
may be unable to secure Indian status for her child at all. The “second generation 
cut-off” stands in the way. Under the pre-1985 legislation, a single woman could 
secure Indian status for her child as long as no one came forward to establish that 
the father was not a status Indian. Without Indian status, it may be impossible for 
the child to live on reserve, or, if allowed on reserve, to access benefits like 
education or health care.  This application of the two-parent rule represents a 
tightening of the previous rules for registration of children whose only known 
parent is a status Indian mother.201 
 
 
 The two-parent rule, like its predecessor barring women from conveying 
status, are government rules that have been applied to limit and reduce the 
population of registered Indians in Canada.  These rules are not consistent with the 
kinship practices of many Indigenous peoples; children who would be accepted as 
members by a First Nation could well be excluded by the statutory rules.  If a First 
Nation choses to have its own membership code, which is an option under the 
Indian Act, Canada will not provide any per capita funding to that Nation for 
anyone who is not considered a registered Indian under Canada’s rules.  There is, in 
other words, a fiscal punishment for inclusiveness. 
 
 
 In the long term, if a First Nation ceases to consist of Indians who are 
registrable or registered under Canada’s rules, it will cease to be entitled to its 
reserve, and the reserve will revert to the Crown.202 What Canada could not 
accomplish by enfranchisement, namely the reabsorption of Indian reserves, it is 
still trying to accomplish by means of the desk murder of registered “Indians”.  
Narrow the definition to the vanishing point, and First Nations’ claims under the 
Indian Act to the only piece of territory left to them after the first great sweep of 
internal colonization will also be gone. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 See Michelle M Mann, Indian Registration: Unrecognized and Unstated Paternity (Ottawa, Status of 
Women Canada, June 2005), executive summary v-vii. 
202 The Act defines Indians as those registered under the Act, and provides that reserves are for the use 
and benefit of Indians. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
I have tried to demonstrate here that colonization is not a feature of Canada’s past, 
but continues with vigour in the present day.  While we now have explicit 
constitutional protections of Indigenous rights, and specific instructions from the 
Supreme Court of Canada that the Crown must behave with honour towards 
Indigenous peoples, enforcing these obligations is extremely difficult in practice.  
What is really required is that Canada renounce its colonizing ways, and embrace a 
new approach of partnership and true reconciliation with Indigenous peoples.  I 
believe that one way of signalling such a change is for Canada to accept 
unreservedly the provisions of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples and to act in accordance with it, in both its policies and its administrative 
practices.  Canada has refused to give that ungrudging endorsement up to now, 
characterizing the Declaration as aspirational, and non-binding203because of its 
concerns that the Declaration gives Indigenous peoples too much power204. The 
degree of power given in the Declaration is only a problem to a state that remains 
determined to pursue its old agenda of internal colonization.  Two hundred and 
fifty years after the issuance of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, it is not too early 
to signal the end of Canada’s colonial era. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Statement of Canada, op cit supra, note 6. 
204 Neve and Benjamin, op cit supra note 9, identify the Declaration’s several requirements of the full, 
prior and informed consent of Indigenous peoples to proposed government action as the source of 
Canada’s concern about the instrument. 
